The Erosion of Pax-Americana and the Rise of Great Power Geopolitics
By THO Contributor, Tarik Oguzlu
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the unification of
Germany in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 epitomized the
end of ideological geopolitics. Since the early 1990s till the end of the first
decade of the twenty first century, analysts observed the rise of a new
geopolitical understanding being defined by many as a new world order. New
world order geopolitics suggested that there was only one super power all over
the world and all other states would gain influence in international politics
in relation to the status of their relationship with the global hegemon. That
sole superpower happened to be the United States. There was a huge power gap
between the United States and all other countries and it was nearly impossible
for any country, acting alone or in cooperation with others, to counterbalance
the American hegemony. Hence, bandwagoning appears to have replaced balancing
in the age American primacy in global politics.
Since the early 1990s until 2008, the United States, in
partnership with its European allies within NATO and the European Union,
dictated international politics. This period was the heyday of the ‘liberal
international order’. Not only did it gradually expand to include former
communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but also the immense
material power capabilities of the United States allowed her to pursue
primacist strategies all around the world. The occupation of Iraq in 2003 and
the United States’ military involvement in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks epitomized the excessive self-confidence of American
decision makers in promoting liberal democratic norms and values.
Until 2008, the rise of China was not central to American
strategic considerations and the European Union was at the apex of its power.
The security concepts of Americans and Europeans alike demonstrated optimism
and self-confidence in western capitals. Neither the national security strategies
adopted by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations in the US nor the
first-ever security strategy document of the EU adopted in 2003 mentioned great
power competition and ideological polarization as potential threats to liberal
international world order. Many circles in the West took comfort in Fukuyama’s
thesis that the history came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and with the growing appeal of liberal-capitalist democracy as the only game in
town. Fukuyama was basically saying that from the dissolution of the Soviet
Union onwards the erstwhile non-capitalist societies would gradually become
part of the US-led liberal capitalist world order because the end of the Cold
War left them only with this option. The Cold War was decisively won by the
liberal capitalist camp and the years ahead would not witness any
ideology-driven geopolitical competition among great powers.
Looking from this perspective, the enlargement of the
European Union and NATO towards former communist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe would accord with the flow of history by transforming almost
every country in Europe in the image of liberal democracy and open market
capitalism. The liberal international order would also enlarge beyond Europe
with the incorporation of many non-western countries into the World Trade
Organization and other multilateral platforms as responsible stakeholders. For
example, China’s membership in the World Trade Organization in 2001 was
heralded with fanfare suggesting that from this time onwards China would
gradually evolve into a liberal democratic polity adopting capitalist toolkit
in economy.
Looking to emerging security structure in this era the
United States would remain as the main security provider across the globe and
many US-led security organizations established during the long Cold War era would
maintain their relevance. For example, rather than NATO being thrown in the
dustbin of history, it would further enlarge to former enemies of the Warsaw
Pact.
The extreme self-confidence on the part of the American
statesmen led them to argue that the United States was the indispensable nation
and there was no need to help bring into existence new regional or global
security organizations that would potentially replace NATO. It was in
accordance with such thinking that whenever the Russian leadership offered the
idea that a new pan-European security organization should be founded replacing
western-dominated ones, the Americans simply ignored them.
A cardinal characteristic of this era was that the
possibility of any great power war would be almost zero because it was assumed
that all great powers would pay an utmost care to get along with the United
States well. Just because none of the great powers was in a position to
challenge the American preeminence and lay claim to hegemony in its own region,
the best thing to do on their side would be bandwagoning with the sole
superpower.
Looking from this perspective, armed conflicts would rather
take place within states. Intrastate wars, viz. civil wars, would replace
interstate wars. The wars in the Balkans and the Caucasus during the 1990s
demonstrated that major threats to regional and global security would stem from
internal conflicts rather than interstate power competitions. During this time
period many states across the globe, saving the United States, decreased their
military spending in proportion to their Cold War era spending and armies went
through a transformation process thereby their peacekeeping and peacemaking
capabilities improved.
This time period also attested to the heyday of the European
Union integration process. The EU both enlarged horizontally and deepened
vertically. Many countries around the globe looked to the European Union
integration process as the ideal example to emulate. EU appeared to be a
successful role model for other countries across the globe. Many westerners
believed that American hegemony would keep the peace in the world and other
countries would be able to devote much more energy and capital to their
economic development and political maturation in line with liberal democratic
capitalist values.
It is within such a geopolitical framework that many
analysts argued that soft power would gradually eclipse hard power in
international politics. As the need to rely on brute force in solving
international problems and achieving foreign policy interests became
meaningless in the context of global peace and security provided by the
American hegemony, countries would increasingly invest in their soft power
capabilities. It is not a coincidence that the literature on soft power
accumulated fast during this era of new world order.
Even though the 9/11 attacks on the US homeland dented the
image of the United States as the omnipotent global hegemon and criticisms of
the American approach to the global war on terror intensified following the US
occupation of Iraq, it was primarily following the financial crisis of the late
2000s that a sense of decline began to percolate down to the western elites in
the United States and EU members. Not only has the feeling of optimism eroded
but also the specter of non-western powers challenging the primacy of western
powers has begun to haunt many westerners. As the Russian resurgence and
Chinese revival took root, the calls for accommodating rising non-western
powers in the institutional structure of the liberal international order began
to be heard more loudly. The revised security strategy of the European Union
(issued in the summer of the 2016), and the first national security strategy of
the Trump administration (issued in December 2017) demonstrate that western
powers have increasingly begun feeling threatened by the rise of non-western
powers. Both documents suggest some ways to deal with the resurgence of traditional
security concerns as well as the worldwide emergence of illiberal
authoritarianism.
Since 2008 there have been disputes all over the world over
the values of multiculturalism, openness, tolerance, and universal human
rights. The morality of universal cosmopolitanism has gradually given way to
the morality of relative communitarianism as rising non-western powers,
primarily China and Russia, have increasingly offered non-western
conceptualizations of international political order. Non-interference in
states’ internal affairs, primacy of state sovereignty, authoritarian
leadership, strengthening of national identities, state-led capitalism, spheres
of influence mentality, multi-polarism in global governance, primacy of great
powers in international relations, mercantilist trade practices, investment in
military power capabilities, an increased use of economic power instruments in
the name of securing geopolitical gains, and the questioning of the principle
‘responsibility to protect’ are some of the points that Russian and Chinese
leaderships have been vehemently prioritizing over the last decade.
This does not, however, suggest that countries like China
have not benefited from the liberal international order, particularly in the
field of economics. Yet, China’s gains from the liberal-capitalist global order
have mainly emanated from western sponsorship, rather than from China acting as
a convicted disciple. So long as the western powers, particularly the United
States, assumed that China would turn out to become a responsible stakeholder
and gradually transform into a liberal democratic polity, they tolerated
China’s rise and its inappropriate trade practices and non-democratic political
values. The West was able to endure some economic losses relative to emerging
powers, so long as it had self-confidence.
Western powers have not been immune to such currents either.
The last decade has witnessed the rise of populist and illiberal political
movements in key western countries. The internal criticism of liberal
democratic practices has severely affected the attractiveness of a liberal
world order. As the Brexit decision in the United Kingdom and the election of
Donald Trump to presidency in the United States demonstrates, the forces of
illiberalism, populism, protectionism, and xenophobia have gained ground in key
western countries.
Parallel to the shift in material power capabilities across
the globe and the growing challenges posed to the normative foundation of the
liberal international order, realpolitik foreign policy practices and pragmatic
concerns in defining national interests have become more pronounced than
moralpolitik practices and normative concerns. Power politics and ‘sphere of
influence’ mentality have experienced a revival over the last decade. As
geo-economic and geo-political motivations have become more decisive in states’
foreign policies, the dynamics of alliance relationships have also gone through
a radical transformation. During the last decade, long-term identity based
alliance relationships have been replaced with short-term, pragmatic, and
issue-oriented strategic partnerships. The practice of forming
interest-oriented cooperation initiatives within multilateral and bilateral
frameworks has gained ground in recent years. In today’s world, countries of
different value orientations, geographical locations, power capabilities, and
threat perceptions are no longer bound to define each other categorically as
enemies or friends. The notion of ‘frenemy’ has already become an identity
signifier in interstate relations. The practice of coalitions defining missions
has gradually given way to the practice of missions defining coalitions. As
opposed to Cold War bipolarity and the unipolar order during the first two
decades of the post-Cold War era, the practice of illiberal authoritarian
states engaging in pragmatic outcome-oriented cooperation with liberal-minded
states is now conceivable.
In today’s international order, the ideological polarization
of opposing power blocks is not as sharp and rigid as it was during the Cold
War era. The interconnectedness between liberal western powers and illiberal
authoritarian powers is much higher now than it was between western capitalist
and eastern communist countries during the Cold war era. This suggests that we
now live in a multiplex world order. Not only are there more actors in
international relations but also issues have become so complex that dealing
with them increasingly requires global perspectives. This world order leads
states with various power capabilities to adopt multidimensional and multidirectional
foreign policy strategies.
Even though the debate on the decline of the West still
lingers and many dispute the idea of declinizm in the United States, it is now
clear that the United States under Trump’s presidency no longer wants to play
the leader of the liberal international order. This creates enough room for
non-western rising powers to act more assertively and become more visible
across the globe.
It is against such a background that the years ahead will likely produce new geopolitical dynamics more akin to those of the Cold War era in which two ideologically different global powers vied for global primacy. It remains to be seen whether the Coronavirus pandemic will usher in a new bipolar confrontation between the United States and China. There are too many unknowns and our next piece will address this question.