Turkey and NATO
By THO Contributor Tarik Oguzlu
Recent years have seen Turkey’s relations with western
countries in general and NATO in particular go from one crisis to another.
Turkey’s buying of S-400 Surface to Air missiles from Russia, rather than
choosing its western allies, has added further insult to the injury. On many
issues concerning Turkish foreign policy, observers have noted that Turkey and
its traditional western allies within NATO have adopted diverging views. Even
though elite groups maintain their commitment to NATO, there is a rising
skepticism toward the West in general. Hence, whither Turkey? Without delving
into the details of each and every issue occupying the agenda of Turkey-NATO
relations, this piece seeks to uncover the dynamics of Turkey’s changing
approach towards NATO from an analytical perspective.
Turkey has been one of the most important members of NATO
since its accession to the Alliance in 1952. Having defined its foreign,
defense and security policies for many years on the basis of NATO membership,
Turkey began to adopt a more questioning and critical perspective toward the
Alliance with the end of the Cold War. Although NATO continues to maintain its
importance in Turkish foreign and security policy thinking, it would be wrong
to suggest that this is at the same level as it was during the Cold War era. After
World War II ended, Turkey wanted to join NATO mainly from a security
perspective. Not possessing the means to cope with the threats stemming from
the Soviet Union on its own, Turkey wanted to secure Western help by joining
NATO. From the very beginning, NATO has been primarily a collective defense
organization for Turkey. Rather than adopting the neutrality policy as Finland
and Austria preferred or bandwagoning with the Soviet Union as many central and
eastern European countries had to do, Turkey decided to deal with the emerging
Soviet threat by placing herself within the western camp.
On the other hand, the American strategists assumed that the
task of fulfilling NATO's containment and deterrence strategies vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union would be much easier if Turkey joined the alliance and prevented
the Soviet penetration into the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern
regions.
Another factor that pushed Turkey to seek membership in NATO
was that this would constitute an important milestone in Turkey's decades-old
Westernization/Europeanization/modernization process. Thanks to NATO
membership, Turkey could argue for many years that it has been a
Western/European state. Compared to other western international organizations,
it has always proved to be much easier for Turkey to help legitimize its
Western/European identity through NATO, for the alliance has mainly been a
collective defense organization and valued Turkey's geographical location and
military capabilities more than its internal characteristics. It would not be
an overestimation to argue that there was one single West during the Cold War
era under American leadership that very much prioritized strategic security
concerns over identity related issues in its efforts to contain the Soviet
menace globally.
Despite the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Johnson Letter
crisis in 1964, the arms embargo crisis in 1975, and the anti-U.S. sentiments
running high in the country from time to time, NATO preserved its privileged
position in Turkey's security thinking during much of the Cold War period. The
most distinctive characteristic of Turkey's approach toward the alliance during
this period was that Turkish elites interpreted the risks of being abandoned by
NATO as much more important than the risks of being entrapped by some alliance
policies. Those whose argued that membership in NATO would antagonize Russians,
put Turkey in unwanted contingencies, turn Turkey into an American satellite
and worsen Turkey’s relations with non-western countries were easily sidelined
by those who saw the salvation in NATO.
After the Cold War ended, Turkey's attitude toward NATO
began to change. The last two decades have seen that compared to its neighbors
Turkey's hard and soft power capabilities have tremendously improved.
Simultaneously, Turkey has begun to play more active foreign policy roles. The
international system has also gained a multipolar character, with the strict
limitations of the Cold War era coming to an end. Such factors have gradually
rendered the one-dimensional and NATO-centric definition of Turkey's foreign
and security policies obsolete. The more Turkey’s maneuvering capability
increased, the more Turkey adopted a questioning attitude towards NATO. While
the end of the Cold War reduced the threats stemming from the Soviet Union and
positively affected Turkish-Russian relations, developments in the Middle East,
the Balkans and the Caucasus have started to become more important in the
context of Turkey's security. As Turkey's capacity to help shape regional developments
strengthened, Turkey adopted a multidimensional and multidirectional foreign
policy orientation.
During the reign of successive Justice and Development Party
(AK Party) governments Turkey has been taking great pains to improve its
relations with neighboring countries, particularly Russia and Iran, and create
zones of peace and stability in its environment. Had Turkey continued to follow
a primarily NATO-oriented foreign and security policy it would have most likely
failed to achieve its goals. At a time of growing strategic confrontation between
the West on the one hand and Russia and Iran on the other, Ankara does not want
to limit its choices by pursing a NATO-first policy.
The identity-based considerations that had been very much
instrumental in shaping Turkey's attitude toward NATO during the Cold War years
have also begun to change with the advent of the 1990s. The common attitude
adopted by all governments over the last two decades is that Turkey's national
identity cannot be defined only in reference to the Western world. This trend
has gained further momentum over the last decade as successive AK Party
governments have defined Turkey as a central country inheriting the legacy of
the Ottoman Empire. Turkish rulers have increasingly adopted a Turkey-centric
worldview in defining national interests and policies. The quest for strategic
autonomy leads Turkish decision makers to embrace a more critical attitude
towards NATO than ever.
Turkey’s critical attitude towards NATO does no way suggest
that Turkey is quite ready to take the risk of appearing as the blacksheep
within the Alliance. Instead, as part of its new national identity and foreign
policy thinking, Turkey has increasingly played a more possessive and shaping
role in NATO's transformation process whereby the number one Turkish objective
has been to ensure Turkey seat at the driving seat during this process, rather
than being a mere item on NATO's transformation agenda. Put simple, Turkey
wants to ensure that NATO's policies do not put Turkey's relations with its
neighbors and its positive image in the Islamic world in jeopardy. Turkey's
Achilles' heel during NATO's transformation process has been to feel sandwiched
between its traditional partners within NATO and its neighbors to the east,
south and north. For example, in line with its questioning and critical stance
throughout NATO's transformation process, Turkey has taken great pains to walk
a fine line between NATO and Russia. Turkey's balancing role in this regard has
recently become more difficult than ever as Washington shows fierce opposition
to Ankara's plans to buy the S-400 missiles from Moscow to improve its air
defense capability.
Besides, in Turkish eyes, NATO's enlargement closer to
Russia and its efforts to increase its military presence in the Black Sea and
Eastern Europe should not lead Russians to feel besieged. Otherwise, this might
push Russia to pursue more nationalist and expansionist policies. This might,
in turn, result in Turkish-Russian relations being defined on the basis of
rivalry and hostility. Similar to other European allies, particularly Germany
and France, Turkey holds the view that Russia's concerns should be given more
priority while elaborating NATO's policies on enlargement, military deployments
in Eastern Europe and the missile defense system. Despite the fact that Turkey
has given its support to NATO's latest efforts to bolster its reassurance and
deterrence initiatives and capabilities in Eastern Europe following Russian
assertiveness in Ukraine, it would not be wrong to assert that Turkey has taken
an utmost care to adopt a balanced and prudent approach in this regard.
Another characteristic of Turkey's changing attitude toward
NATO is that despite having adopted a critical and questioning stance during
NATO's transformation process Turkey has paid utmost care not to veto any
particular decision all other allies agreed on. The best example of this
attitude took place on the occasion of NATO's military operation in Libya.
Turkey initially opposed NATO's intervention in Libya. Turkey was extremely
sensitive on the possibility of this NATO operation causing severe human losses
in Libya and negatively affecting Turkey's image across the Islamic world.
However, once the allies sorted out their disagreements and decided that NATO
should take over operational responsibility, Turkey became a part of this
consensus. Yet, Turkey played an important role in setting the limits and
operational mandate of the operation to be carried out in Libya.
Turkey also wants to play an active role in NATO's efforts
to reach out to the Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf
regions. Turkey actively supported NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiatives (ICI). Turkey lent its support to NATO's efforts
to develop lasting security cooperation with the countries in those regions and
to project its values. However, Turkey is not on the same page with the United
States concerning the establishment of a Middle East Security Alliance (MESA),
a looser version of NATO in the Middle East, for this runs the risk of
strengthening existing polarizations in the region. Any Middle East NATO that
puts Iran in its crosshair would not be in Turkey’s national interests.
Turkey's new attitude toward NATO is now increasingly
informed by more interest-based calculations than identity-related
considerations. The risks of being entrapped by NATO's policies rather than the
risks of being abandoned by the alliance seem to matter more to Turkish
decision-makers. As Turkey's dependency on NATO in terms of security and
identity decreased, Turkey has adopted a more questioning attitude toward the
alliance.
Although Turkey's dependence on NATO is decreasing and the
alliance is losing its erstwhile privileged position in Turkish eyes, Turkey
still attaches importance to NATO. The growing specter of territorial
disintegration in Iraq and Syria, the transformation of the Middle East into an
ungovernable anarchic environment in a Hobbesian fashion following the U.S.
military withdrawal and the new dynamics of the Kurdish movement across the
region seem to have all added up to Turkey's feelings of insecurity. As of
today, securing NATO’s missile defense shield and nuclear umbrella is still
vital to Turkey’s national interests. Membership in NATO still matters given
that the ongoing internal war in Syria carries the risk of putting Turkey's
territorial security in jeopardy.
Membership in NATO is still the most important evidence of Turkey's place in the Western international community. Withdrawing from NATO or adopting an obstructionist attitude within the alliance might bring into existence serious suspicions on Turkey's foreign policy intentions and interests. This situation will affect Turkey's relations with Western actors negatively. NATO is still important for Turkey, yet Turkey's changing identity and interests will continue to lead Turkish decision-makers to adopt more questioning and critical attitudes toward the alliance in the years to come. Finally, the latest developments in the Idlib region of Syria have undoubtedly demonstrated that if the Turkey wants to lessen the burden of refugees on its soldiers and find a political solution to the civil war, it needs to have western allies on its side. Otherwise, working for a solution through the Russian connection would most likely produce a pro-Russian outcome. Turkey needs NATO to increase its leverage vis-à-vis Russia.