Westernization and Ataturk’s Legacy in Turkish Foreign Policy
By: THO Contributor, Tarik Oguzlu
Westernization is a very important structural
variable of Turkish foreign policy in the sense that since the second half of
the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire’s efforts to join the key
western/European international organizations, viz. external westernization, has
gone hand in hand with the transformation process at home in line with the
constitutive norms and values of western international community, viz. internal
westernization.
Westernization is also thought of a security
strategy in that Turkey would feel itself safe and secure if it came closer to
the West/Europe and its western/European identity were recognized as such by
westerners/Europeans. Given that the Ottoman Empire came to an end at the hands
of the western European nations, the founding fathers of the Republic assumed
that Turkey’s security and survival would be ensured should Europeans see
Turkey as a member of the western/European family of nations. Looking from this
perspective the danger would arise if western/European nations continued to
define Turkey among Europe’s others. The more Europeans defined Turks as their
others, the more likely Turkey would be put in the crosshair of Europeans.
Westernization/Europeanization process has
both negative and positive connotations in the context of Turkish foreign
policy. Turks love and hate westerners simultaneously. The negative experiences
of the Ottoman past would assumingly be left behind if Turkey completed its
westernization process. However, whenever westerners/Europeans questioned the credentials
of Turkey’s western identity, the dominant view on the part of the majority of
Turks happened to be that westerners did never and would never recognize Turkey
as western/European. For example, the reluctance of Europeans to admit Turkey
to EU membership has generally been interpreted as the continuation of the
traditional European attitude towards Turkey, according to which Turks have
been among the constitutive others of Europeans.
Turkey’s membership in NATO since 1952 and the
ongoing accession negotiations with the European Union have long been the most
important dimensions of Turkish foreign policy, no matter Turkish decision
makers of different political persuasions have from time to time adopted
non-western alternatives. Westernization has mostly manifested itself in
Turkey’s efforts to side with the US-led western international community
against the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Claiming to represent the
western world in its regional environment and playing an active role in the
promotion of western/European values onto non-western geographies in its close
proximity has constituted one of the hallmarks of Turkish foreign policy.
Despite all kind of problems experienced in relations with western/European
nations, particularly during the post-Cold war era, Turkey’s westernization
process is still on and membership in NATO is seen vital to the fulfillment of
Turkey’s national security interests. Many other foreign policy alternatives
have mostly come to the agenda whenever Turkey’s relations with
western/European nations deteriorated. For example, the growing crisis in
relations with the United States during the course of the developments
associated with the so-called Arab Spring seems to partially account for
Turkey’s coming closer to Russia and Iran. Similarly, at times of tension in
Turkey’s relations with the European Union, the idea of Eurasianism tends to
become popular among Turkey’s strategic elites.
Turkey does not have a fundamental problem
with the mainstays of the liberal international order and has never adopted a
strictly revolutionary attitude towards its replacement by any non-western
alternative. Yet, Turkey’s main priority is that its claim to strategic
autonomy and an equal relationship with its western/European partners be
recognized and given due respect within the contours of the emerging multipolar
world order.
That said, westernization/Europeanization
process in Turkish policy is closely associated with the legacy of Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic. Despite the fact that Turkey gained
its independence against the colonial European nations in the early 1920s, Ankara
soon mended its relations with key western/European capitals with a view to
containing and then defeating the revisionist powers. Turkey’s number one
national interest during the interwar era was to protect the newly gained
independence and sovereignty as well as successfully completing the radical
transformation process at home, and this transformation led by Ataturk was very
much western/European in its essence. Such efforts on the part of the founding
fathers of the Turkish Republic required the pursuit of a pragmatic, prudent
and realist foreign policy, enshrining the principle of ‘peace at home peace in
the world’. Turkish rulers tried to help bring into existence a stable and
cooperative regional environment so that developments outside the borders would
never have negative consequences on the ongoing modernization and development
processes at home.
In this sense there seems to exist a strong
degree of continuity between Turkey’s efforts to support regional cooperation
during the interwar years through the Balkan Entente and Saadabad Pact and the
attempts of the Justice and Development Party governments at encouraging regional
cooperation initiatives over the last two decades.
Western/European friendly pragmatic Turkish
foreign policy approach also suggested that Turkey would do well to construct good
neighborly relations with its former enemies. Involvement in the internal
affairs of other states and pursuit of expansionist and irredentist foreign
policies do not hold any place in Ataturk’s foreign policy understanding and
this is very much line with the Westphalian character of the liberal
international order long supported by key western/European nations. This is the
main reason why any attempt at regime change abroad is very much criticized at
home. Traditionally Turkish foreign policy has long reflected the idea that
states are independent in their internal affairs and Turkey should not be
involved in the business of regime change or value promotion. Trying to solve
national security problems through diplomacy and international law is another
legacy of Ataturk’s foreign policy understanding, which is also a point shared
in common with European foreign policy culture. The revision of the Lasuanne
regulations on the status of Turkish Straits through the Montreaux Convention
in 1936, the incorporation of Hatay region into Turkey in 1939, and the
settlement of the Mousul question and the border dispute with Iraq in 1926 are
all examples of using international law and diplomacy effectively in Turkish
foreign policy.